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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the existence,of n-firm Cournot 
equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity. It proves 
that if each firm's marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output 
of other firms increases (which is implied by concave inverse demand) 
then a Cournot equilibrium exists, without assuming that firms have 
nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies. Also, if the 
marginal revenue condition fails at a "potential optimal point," there 
is a set of firms such that no Cournot equilibrium exists. The paper 
also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms, 
each with constant returns to scale production. 
ON THE EXISTENCE OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM* 
by 
William Novshek 
1. Introduction 
Cournot equilibrium is commonly used as a solution concept in 
oligopoly models, but the conditions under which a Cournot equilibrium 
can be expected to exist are not well understood. The nature of each 
firm's technology, whether all firms have identical technologies, and 
restrictions on the market inverse demand vary from model to model, 
and are all important for the existence of Cournot equilibrium. This 
paper examines the question of existence of (pure strategy) Cournot 
equilibrium in a single market for a homogeneous good. In this 
context there are two known types of existence theorems. The first 
type allows general (downward sloping) inverse demand and shows the 
existence of Cournot equilibrium when there are n identical firms with 
convex technologies (nondecreasing marginal cost and no avoidable 
fixed costs). See McManus [1962, 1964] and Roberts and Sonnenschein 
[1976]. The second type shows the existence of Cournot equilibrium in 
markets with n not necessarily identical firms when each firm' s profit 
function is concave. Sometimes the concavity of profit functions is an 
explicit assumption (see Frank and Quandt [196 3)), other times 
assumptions on the inverse demand and cost functions which imply 
concave profit functions are used (for example, inverse demand is 
assumed to be concave over the range where it is positive and all 
firms have convex cost functions in Szidarovszky and Yakowitz 
[1977]).1 
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The main result of the paper is a new existence theorem for 
n-firm Cournot equilibrium. With only minimal assumptions on cost 
functions, and without requiring identical firms or convex 
technologies we show that a commonly imposed assumption on inverse 
demand is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an n-firm Cournot 
equilibrium. The condition is equivalent to the condition that 
(throughout the relevant region) each firm's marginal revenue is 
declining in the aggregate output of other firms, and is commonly 
imposed in the industrial organization literature and in the 
literature concerning the comparative static properties of Cournot 
equilibrium (see for example Ruffin [1971] and Okuguchi [1973)). The 
new existence theorem shows that this literature can drop essentially 
all of the common assumptions imposed on the cost functions of the 
firms (for example, convexity of cost functions) and still obtain 
existence of equilibrium with only the marginal revenue condition. 
Assumptions on cost functions need only be introduced if needed in the 
subsequent comparative static analysis. 
The marginal revenue condition is implied by concave inverse 
demand, another common assumption in this literature. Thus the new 
existence theorem shows it is possible to drop the explicit or 
implicit assumptions on the cost functions needed in the second, 
previous type of existence theorem (using concave profit functions). 
We also provide two examples of nonexistence of Cournot 
equilibrium to help delineate the conditions under which equilibrium 
can be expected to exist. The first example is of a well-known type, 
and it shows that general demand and identical firms with nonconvex 
technologies can lead to nonexistence of equilibrium. The second 
example does not seem to be well known. It shows that with general 
demand and convex technologies, if firms are not identical then 
equilibrium may not exist. 
3 4 
2. Previous Existence Results 
Consider the market for � single homogeneous good with inverse 
demand function P(") and n firms. Firm f e {1,2, • • •  ,n} has cost 
function Cf(.). 
Definition : (y1,y2,···,yn) e JR � is a Cournot equilibrium if 
n 
PC [ Y ->Yr - cr<Yr> J=l J 2 
n 
P( [ y . - Yr+ y)y - Cf(y) 
J=l J 
In a remark we also examine the extent to which the for all y 2 0, for all f e {1,2, • • •  ,n} .
assumptions of the new existence theorem can be weakened. The only 
really substantial assumption, the marginal revenue condition, is not 
a necessary condition for existence of equilibrium since the condition 
may fail at an "irrelevant point. " However, we show that if, for some 
inverse demand function, the condition fails at some point which is a 
"feasible optimal choice" then there exists an integer n, and n firms 
with cost functions satisfying the assumptions of the theorem, such 
that the market with these n firms and the given inverse demand 
function has no pure strategy Cournot equilibrium. 
In Section 2 we introduce the basic definitions of the model 
and state versions of the previous existence theorems. In Section 3 
we present our two examples of nonexistence. Section 4 contains the 
new existence theorem. Section 5 contains remarks on weakening the 
assumptions of the theorem, on extension of the existence theorem to 
endogenous n <i-�·· the case of an unlimited number of potential 
firms), and on the use of the theorem to prove a very general version 
of the limit results in Novshek [1980]. 
Theorem!= (McManus [1964]). Given a market for a single 
homogeneous good with inverse demand P(0) and n identical firms, each 
with cost function C(0), if 
(1) P:(O,=) �JR+ is a nonincreasing, upper-semi-continuous function 
<i-� . •  for all Y > 0, for all e > O there exists a 6 > 0 such 
that IX - YI < 6 implies P(X) < P(Y) + e), and total revenue, 
YP(Y), is bounded, and 
(2) C :JR+ � JR+ is continuous and monotonically increasing, and the 
increase in cost for any given increase in output does not 
decrease with output <i-�·· for any y > y' 2 0 and q > 0, 
C(y + q) - C(y) 2 C (y' + q) - C(y')),2 
then an n-firm Cournot equilibrium exists. 
McManus showed that all jumps in the reaction correspondence, 
r(Y) := {ye JR+IPCY + y)y - C(y) 2 P(Y + x)x - C (x) for all x e JR+} ' 
must be jumps up, so the line y = Y/(n - 1) must intersect the graph 
of the reaction correspondence, yielding a symmetric n-firm 
equilibrium. 
As noted in the introduction, the second type of existence 
theorem takes various forms. For comparison we state it as follows : 
Theorem 1: (Szidarovszky and Yakowitz [1977]). Given a 
market for a single homogeneous good with inverse demand P(") and n 
firms with cost functions c1,c2, • • •  ,cn' if 
(1) P :lR+ � lR+ is nonincreasing and is twice continuously 
differentiable and concave on the interval where it has positive 
value (so P(Y) > O implies P'(Y) � 0 and P''(Y) � 0), and 
(2) for all f c {1,2, • • •  ,n} , Cf :lR + � lR+ is nondecreasing, twice 
, 
continuously differentiable, and convex (so Cf(y) l 0 and 
, , 
cf (y) l o for all y) 
then there exists an n-firm Cournot equilibrium. 
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from the observation that, in 
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the relevant region, each firm's profit function is concave in its own 
output, so a standard existence theorem for concave games can be 
applied. 
3. Examples of Nonexistence 
Our first example of nonexistence has an inverse demand 
function which is not everywhere concave, and identical firms with 
nonconvex cost functions. The possibility of nonexistence under these 
conditions is well known. 
Examole .!_: Inverse demand is 
{
100 - 4Y 
527 - 1712Y 
P{Y) = 14 - 2Y 
0 
Y c [O, .25]
Ya c.25,.31 
Y a C.3, 11 
Ya <1.=> 
and all firms have identical cost functions with decreasing average 
cost : 
{ 0 10 + y C (Y) 
The reaction correspondence is then 
r(Y) = l 
{.!. - Y} 4 
{!. - y !1 y 4 ' 4 - 2} 
{13 - 11 4 2 
{,/S , O} 
{0} 
y = 0 
y > 0 
Y c [O ,/3--;s:Ji - 183' - ) 
,1ii5i6 - 183y 2 
Y a clii5i6 - 183 2 
Y = 13 - 2.Js2 
Y a c1; - 2.;5 . => 
!1 
' 2 2.Js> 
For n 2 2 there is no n-firm equilibrium in this example: 
each active firm produces more than all other firms combined (�.� • •
for all Y, all nonzero elements of r(Y) exceed Y) so at most one firm 
can be active. But if only one firm is active it produces the 
6 
monopoly output, which is not viable with n 2 2, since 0 � r(�). This 
example can be easily modified to show nonexistence with U-shaped 
average cost. 
We now turn to cases in which firms have different 
technologies. Again inverse demand is not everywhere concave but the 
two firms have convex cost functions (constant marginal cost with no 
fixed cost) which are different. The possibility of nonexistence 
under these conditions seems not to be well known. 
Example 1: Inverse demand is 
P(Y) = { 
2 - y 
8219 19 
8119 - 8119y 
10019 
_ lOOY 19 
0 
Y S [O , . 99] 
100 y 6 ( .99 • 191
y s (100 100.19] 19 • 19 
y S (
10�919 , co) 
There are two firms with constant marginal cost and no fixed costs, 
but firm 1 has marginal cost 881/800 while firm 2 has marginal cost 
381/400. 
The first firm's reaction correspondence is 
rl (Y) 
{
719 y {1600 - 21 
{ 0} 
719] y S [O 
• 800 
S (719 
co
) y 800 ' 
7 8 
while the second firm's reaction correspondence is 
r(Y) = I 
{419 - 11800 2 
398 100 21 
{300 • 19 - 4001 
{100 _ Yl 19 
{8000722 - 11 3040000 2 
{Ol 
21 y S [O ' 400) 
21 y = 400 
21 3999639 y s <400 • 760000 ] 
y s (3999639 8000722] 760000 • 1520000 
8000722 Y S (1520000 ' co) 
From Figure 1 we see there is no equilibrium. This example can be 
easily modified to strictly increasing average cost, or strictly 
decreasing average cost, or U-shaped average cost. 
4. Existence Theorem 
The new existence theorem improves Theorem 2 by removing the 
requirement that firms have convex cost functions and weakening the 
assumption that inverse demand be concave. The remaining assumption 
on cost functions is quite minimal, and is needed to guarantee that 
each firm's reaction correspondence is nonempty valued. The only 
restrictive assumption is the (commonly used) requirement that a 
firm's marginal revenue be everywhere (in the relevant region) a 
declining function of the aggregate output of others; i-�·· for all 
nonnegative y and Y with P(y + Y) > 0, for revenue yP(Y + y), 
a2£yP(Y + y)l . . . 
aYay = P'(Y + y) + yP''(Y + y) � o. This assumption is used 
to establish the key to the proof, the fact that each firm's reaction 
correspondence rf' is nonincreasing in the sense that Y' > Y implies 
max rf (Y') � min rf (Y). This implies that any jumps in rf are jumps 
9 
down. McManus proved Theorem 1 by showing that with convex costs, all 
jumps in the reaction correspondence were jumps up, so with identical 
firms a symmetric equilibrium exists. Example 2 showed that the 
assumption of identical firms was necessary for his result. In the 
proof of Theorem 3 we use the fact that each firm's reaction 
correspondence is nonincreasing to show that even when firms are not 
identical, an n-firm Cournot equilibrium exists. 
Theorem 1: Given a market for a single homogeneous good with 
inverse demand P (0) and n firms with cost functions c1,c2, • • •  ,Cn' if 
( 1) P :IB + -7 m + is continuous, 
(2) there exists Z' < = such that P (Z') = 0 and P is twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing on [0,Z'), 
(3) for all Z e [0,Z'), P'(Z) + ZP'' (Z) i 0, and 
(4) for all f e {1,2, • • •  ,n}, Cf:IB + -7 IB + is a nondecreasing, 
lower-semi-continuous function (;i,_.� • •  for all y 2 0, for all
e > O there exists a & > 0 such that I x - y l < & implies 
Cf(x)) Cf (y) - e), 
then there exists an n-firm Cournot equilibrium. 
Note that given assumption (2), assumption (3) is equivalent 
to the assumption that for all nonnegative Y and y with Y + y < Z', 
P'(Y + y) + yP''(Y + y) i 0, so each firm's marginal revenue is 
decreasing in the aggregate output of other firms. 
Proof: Let the assumptions of Theorem 3 hold. First observe 
the properties of each firm's reaction correspondence. For any 
10 
Y < Z', for any firm, all optimal responses to Y are less than z• - Y 
since the response y = (Z' - Y)/2 generates strictly positive revenue 
(compared to zero revenue for outputs greater than or equal to Z' - Y 
because P(Z') = 0) at lower cost (because all cost functions are 
nondecreasing). For Y < Z', the reaction correspondence is thus 
rf (Y) := {ye [0,Z'] I P (Y + y)y - Cf(y) 2 P (Y + x)x - Cf (x)
for all x e [0,Z']}. 
For convenience we define rf (Z') := {0}. Note zero is always an 
optimal response to Z', but other responses are also optimal if 
Cf (y) = Cf(O) for some y > O. These other responses are clearly not 
interesting. By our assumptions, each rf is a nonempty valued, 
upper-hemi-continuous correspondence on [0,Z'] . If Y < Y' < Z' and 
y < y' = max rf (Y') then y' r
P (Y + y')y'-P(Y + y)y = j [P(Y + x) + xP'(Y + x)]dx 
r, 
y 
2 [P(Y' + x) + xP'(Y' + x)] dx = P (Y' + y')y' - P(Y' + y)y 
y 
2 Cf (y') - Cf (y) 
where the first weak inequality follows from assumptions (2) and (3) 
and our initial note, and the second weak inequality follows from 
y' 8 rf (Y'). Thus y � rf (Y), and rf is nonincreasing in the sense 
that Y' > Y implies max rf (Y') i min rf (Y). Each rf has at most 
countably many discontinuities, and all jumps are jumps down. 
Next, for each f, use rf to define the convex valued 
correspondence sf by sf (Y) := convex hull of rf (Y) for Y 8 [0,Z'] . 
Then sf is also nonincreasing in the sense above, and for each 
11 
y S [O, max rf(O)], the set of Y with y S sf(Y) is a nonempty, closed 
interval. 
Now define the upper-hemi-continuous, possibly empty valued 
correspondence bf by 
bf(Q) := {q l there exists Y S [0,Z'] such that q S rf(Y) and Y + q = Q}
(see Novshek [1984] for a detailed discussion of this correspondence). 
Similarly define the correspondence hf by 
hf(Q) : =  {q l there exists Y S [O,Z'] such that q S sf(Y) and Y + q = Q}. 
Consider the properties of bf and hf. First, note that 
bf(Z') = hf(Z') = {0} for all f. The graph of hf can be continuously 
* * 
parameterized as (Qf(t), qf(t)) for t S [0,1] such that 
* * * * * 
(Qf(O), qf(O)) = (Z',0), qf(t) S hf(Qf(t)) for all t, qf(t) is 
* * 
nondecreasing in t, and (Qf(l), qf(l)) = (max rf(O), max rf(O)). Thus 
larger qf values are associated with larger t values. Vertical jumps 
in rf correspond to "jumps" along a 45 degree line for bf (if 
y, y' S rf(Y) and y F y' then y S bf(Y + y) but y' S bf(Y + y')). The 
only difference between bf and hf is that these "45 degree jumps" have 
been filled in with a line segment in the graph of hf. For each q, 
the set of Q with q S bf(Q) is a closed interval, possibly empty. See 
Figure 2. Note the points a1 and a2 at which branches of bf disappear 
as Q increases. By the definition of bf' (q1,q2,···,qn) is a Cournot 
n 
equilibrium if and only if qf S bf( [ q .) for all f. 
J=l J 
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The points at which branches of the correspondence bf 
disappear as Q increases (such as .C°i,q1) in Figure 2) play an 
important role in the proof. We first prove the result for the case 
in which the union over all f of these points is a finite set. Then 
we explain the modifications needed for the case in which this set is 
infinite. 
Let Tf be the set of points at which a branch of bf disappears 
n 
as Q increases, let T U Tf' and let T' be the set of Q values such f=l 
that (Q,q) S T for some q. Until stated otherwise, we assume T is 
finite. Then T' is also finite. Let T' = {Q1,···. �} where 
a1 > a2 > • • •  > Qk. Since bf(Z') = {0} for all f, Z' > °i· Starting 
at Z', we will decrease Q, assigning some qf(Q) S bf(Q) to each firm 
n 
at each Q until we reach an equilibrium at Q• = )" qf(Q*). �l 
n 
At Q=Z', bf(Q) = {0} so qf(Z') = 0 and )" qf(Z') = 0 < Z'. �l 
In 
(Q1,z•), for each f, qf(Q) is assigned so that it is continuous and 
nonincreasing on CQ1,z• ]. This is well defined because the graph of 
each hf can be continuously parameterized as discussed earlier. If at 
n 
any Q S (°i,Z'], )" qf(Q) = Q we are done. If not, for each f let �l 
n 
qf = lim Q-7°i 
qf(Q). If )" qf = a1 we are done (since the bf are�l 
Q > °i
upper-hemi-continuous). If not, let F1 = {f l CQ1,q) S Tf for some 
q} F -· Let {f1,r2, • • •  ,fm} = F1 where r1 < r2 < • • •  < fm. For f � F1 
set qf(Q1) = qf' so qr(") is continuous
 from the right. We now 
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introduce discontinuities into qr(") for some f@ F1 as follows. Let 
qf CQ1) = max {q
lq = qf or both C°i,ql 8 Tf and qf i qi 01-1 1 1 1 
m 
[ qr<01> - [ qr _J 
f�F j=2 J 1 
i_. � •• qr CQ1) jumps to the largest point of a discontinuity in bf 1 1 
which does not lead to a sum of individual actions exceeding o1• If 
the sum equals 01 we are done. If not, repeat the process for r2 
(using qr CQ1) as the value assigned to f1), etc. , until either the 1 
sum equals Q1, in which case we are done, or qf_
CQ1) is assigned for 
J 
n 
all j = 1,2, ••• ,m, and j;
1
qr< °i> < o1• In C°i,Q2), for each f, qf(Q) 
is assigned so that it is continuous and nonincreasing on CQ2,°il· 
This is again well defined by the properties of bf. At Q2 we repeat 
the procedure used at 01• 
Continue the process until we get an equilibrium or it cannot 
continue, as at (Q',q') in Figure 2. We cannot reach points such as 
this if all continuous branches of bf are nonincreasing in Q as in 
Figure 3. (This is the case if no rf ever has slope less than ,, 
negative one, such as when Cf (y) L P'(Y + y) for all Y and y.) In
Figure 3 we could not reach (Q',q') since )" q.(Q') + q' < Q' implies 
!Fr i 
i�fqi(°i) + ql i I;fqi(Q') + ql I;
f
qi(Q') + q' + (ql q') 
J;
f
qi(Q') + q' + (Ql - Q') < 01 
so firm f should have been moved to the branch ending at (Q1,q1) when 
14 
Q was 01• 
Thus to reach an end of tpe process before reaching an 
equilibrium some firm must have a branch of bf which increases as Q 
increases. Pick one firm, say j, for which the process of decreasing 
Q cannot continue. Now increase Q maintaining all other firms on 
their previously determined paths, qf(Q). Recall qf(Q) is 
nonincreasing in Q (it is nonincreasing where continuous and all jumps 
are jumps down). Firm j follows a new continuous nondecreasing path 
* 
qj(Q) which may require following a "45 degree jump" which is part of 
hj but not bj (such as the increasing dotted segment beginning at
(Q',q') in Figure 2). However, as in the discussion of Figure 3, 
Q - <J;
j 
qf(Q) + q�(Q)) cannot change sign along this "45 degree jump. " 
But this process cannot continue until this nondecreasing branch of h. 
J 
ends (such as at CQ2,q2l in Figure 2) since qj(Q) did not jump up to 
that point in the previous process of defining q.(0). At the starting 
J 
point of the new procedure, Q - <J;
j
qf(Q) + q�(Q)) was positive. As Q 
* 
increases, all the jumps in the qr(") are jumps down, while qj is 
* 
continuous. At the end of the continuous branch of q.(0), J 
Q - <J;
j
qf(Q) + q�(Q)) is negative. 
Cournot equilibrium in this process. 
Thus we must reach an n-firm 
Now consider the case in which T is infinite. Two 
possibilities must be dealt with : there may be some Q such that for 
infinitely many q, (Q,q) e T, or there may be infinitely many Q in T'.
In the first case, it may be necessary to replace "maximum" with 
"supremum" in the step used to define qr. (Q) at a Q value 
J 
15 
corresponding to the end of infinitely many branches of bf.' but this 
J 
creates no problem since bf. is upper-hemi-continuous. In the second 
J 
case, we must explain how to continue the process of defining the qf 
when Q is a limit point of T'. If qf has been defined on [Q',Z'] for 
all f, then either Cq1{Q'), • • •  , qn {Q')) is an equilibrium, or qf need 
not be defined for any Q < Q' since we have reached a point from which 
Q should be increased with only one qf being replaced with a 
* 
continuous, nondecreasing qf as in the last step of the proof for T 
finite, or there is a "branch" of bf which is "continuous from the 
left" at {Q',qf(Q')). In the case of the continuous "branch", the 
"branch" may consist of infinitely many actual branches, but the jumps 
between branches become arbitrarily small as {Q',qf(Q')) is 
n 
approached. If j;
1
qf{Q') < Q• then for some & > 0, for 
Q S [Q' - e,Q'), qf can be defined as the maximum of the bf values in 
the "branch". Then qf may have infinitely many jumps in [Q' - e,Q'), 
n 
but is continuous at Q', and }" qf(Q) < Q for Q near Q'. r=l 
Thus the
process of defining qf can be continued at limit points of T' when 
necessary. This completes the extension of the result to T infinite. 
Q. E. D. 
5. Remarks 
5.1 Can the assumptions of Theorem 3 be significantly weakened? 
The first thing to note is that the marginal revenue condition is the 
only really substantial assumption. The assumptions about cost 
functions are either basic economic assumptions (nondecreasing cost) 
16 
or necessary to guarantee that each firm's reaction correspondence is 
nonempty valued {lower-semi-cont�nuous cost). The other assumptions 
on inverse demand can't be weakened significantly without being 
inconsistent with the marginal revenue condition. To be consistent 
with the marginal revenue condition {or its nondifferentiable analog) 
P cannot be increasing or have jumps up, and any jumps down must be 
jumps to zero {Theorem 3 can easily be extended to the case of a 
single jump to zero for the inverse demand). Inverse demand is 
assumed twice continuously differentiable to use the differentiable 
version of the marginal revenue condition. Finally, if we assume that 
monopoly revenue is not maximized at infinite output 
( lim ZP(Z) < sup ZP(Z)) then the marginal revenue condition implies 
z� z 
that there is some Z' such that P(Z') = o. Thus the only significant 
assumption is the marginal revenue condition. 
The marginal revenue condition is not a necessary condition 
for the existence of Cournot equilibrium because it can fail at an 
irrelevant point. However, if it fails at a "potential optimal point" 
then a counterexample can be constructed. A "potential optimal point" 
y (in response to aggregate output Y by other firms) is a point at 
which total revenue exceeds the total revenue at all smaller outputs 
(in response to Y). Since all cost functions are nondecreasing, any 
point failing this condition could not be an optimal response for a 
firm with any cost function. Counterexamples to a general existence 
theorem when the marginal revenue condition fails at a "potential 
optimal point" are constructed in the proof of the following result. 
Theorem ±: Given an inverse demand function P such that
(1) P :lR + � lR + is continuous,
(2) there exists Z' < = such that P(Z') = O and P is twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing on [0,Z'), 
and 
17 
(3) there exist nonnegative y and Y such that y + Y < Z', 
y 
P'(Y + y) + yP''(Y + y) > 0, and J [P(Y + z) + zP'(Y + z)]dz > 0 
y' 
for all y' S [0,y) 
there exists an integer n and n cost functions c1, • • •  ,Cn' satisfying
(4) for all f S {1,2, • • •  ,n}, Cf:lR+ � lR+ is a nondecreasing,
lower-semi-continuous function Ci.�·· for all y L 0, for all 
e > 0 there exists 6 > 0 such that Ix - yl < 6 implies 
Cf(x ) > Cf(y) - e),
such that the market with inverse demand P and n firms with cost 
functions c1, • • •  ,Cn does not have a Cournot equilibrium.
Conditions (1), (2), and (4) of Theorems 3 and 4 are 
identical. Condition (3) of Theorem 4 requires that Condition (3) of 
Theorem 3 fail at a "potential optimal point". Theorem 3 shows that 
if an inverse demand function satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3) 
of that theorem then for any integer n, and any n cost functions 
satisfying condition (4), an n-firm Cournot equilibrium exists. In 
the proof of Theorem 4 we will construct an example to show that if an 
inverse demand function satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 3 
but fails condition (3) of Theorem 3 at a "potential optimal point" 
then there exists an integer n and n cost functions satisfying 
condition (4) of Theorem 3 such that there is no n-firm Cournot 
equilibrium. 
Proof: Assume the conditions of the Theorem hold. Then we 
can find strictly positive y* and Y* such that P(Y* + y*) > O, 
18 
P'(Y* + y*) + y*P''(Y* + y*) ) 0, P(Y* + y*) + y*P'(Y* + y*) > 0, and 
Y* 
r [P(Y* + z) + zP'(Y* + z)]dz > 0 for all y' S [0,y*). We will
Jy, 
sketch the construction of the required example. 
The first firm has no set up cost, and marginal cost which is 
constant and near zero on [O,y* - 6], continuous and linear on 
, 
[y* - 6,y* + 6) with c1Cy*) = P(Y* + y*) + y*P'(Y* + y*), and very
large and nondecreasing on [y* + 6,=). By choice of sufficiently 
small 6, this generates a firm with a corresponding b1(") which, in a
neighborhood of Y* + y•, is single valued and strictly increasing with 
slope very small and strictly positive. 
All other firms are identical, with marginal cost constant and 
near zero on [0,e) and extremely large on (e,=). These firms have a 
set up cost so that there are two optimal responses to aggregate 
output Y* + y* - e by other firms, zero and e. By choice of e 
sufficiently small, these firms all have corresponding bf which are
[e} on [0,Y* + y* - e), {0,e} on [Y* + y* - e,Y* + y•], and {0} on 
(Y* + y*,=). 
n 
With 6 < Y*, �
1
bf(Q) = b1(Q) � Y* + 6 < Q for
Q S (Y* + y*,m). Choosing n very large, 
n �
l
bf(Q) 2 (n-l)e > Y* + Y* > Q for Q S [0,Y* + y* - e).
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Thus if an 
equilibrium exists, O* must be in [Y* + Y* - e,Y* + y*]. Let [Y*/e] 
be the greatest integer less or equal to Y*/e. If e is chosen very 
small and such that the fractional part of Y*/e Ci.� . •  Y*/e - [Y*/e])
is very near one (relative to the slope of b1 near Y* + y*) then
b1(Q) + ( [Y*/e1 + l)e > Q for all Q S [Y* + y* - e,Y* + y*] while
b1(Q) + [Y*/e]e < Q for all Q S [Y* + Y* - e,Y* + y*]. Thus for
appropriately chosen small 6 and e there is no equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
5.2 We now consider the extension of the theorem to exogenous 
determination of n. For some types of cost functions it is already 
the case that in equilibrium some firms will be inactive (when n is 
sufficiently large), so n is endogenous in those cases. However, 
Theorem 3 cannot be extended to n without additional conditions. 
First, note that equilibrium does not exist for n = m under the 
conditions of Theorem l�identical firms with convex cost, whether or 
not inverse demand is concave. This is easily seen using the 
"backward mapping" b . •  In this case, for large Q, b.(Q) = {0) but as
J J 
Q declines b. continuously increases (at least initially). If Q' is
J 
the smallest output at which b.(Q) 
J 
{O) then [ b.(Q')
J=l J 
0 < Q' but 
for all e > 0, [ b .(Q' - e) = m > Q'. Because average cost is
J=l J 
minimized at infinitesimal outputs, if any firm is active then all 
firms are active. For any exogenous n this creates no problem. 
However, for n = m there is no equilibrium. 
20 
The continuity of b. near
J 
Q' prevents the extension of the.existence result to endogenous n. 
This is in contrast to the case of the U-shaped average cost (and 
additional conditions, see Novshek [1980]), in which discontinuities 
in bj were used to show existence of equilibrium for n = m. (In
equilibrium all but a finite number of firms are inactive.) 
There are other technical issues beyond continuity. However, 
these other issues have minimal economic content. Thus Theorem 3 can 
be extended to endogenous determination of the number of active firms 
except for the case of identical firms with convex cost functions (and 
some other technicalities). 
5.3 If we consider a sequence of Markets � which converge to a 
perfectly competitive limit market M with infinitesimal firms, we can 
ask (1) for k large does Mk have a Cournot equilibrium and (2) how do
the Cournot equilibria of Mk compare to the competitive equilibria of 
M? For a special case in which firms were identical within each Mk'
and the markets were related in a very strong way, Novshek [1980] 
shows that with downward sloping inverse demand and U-shaped average 
cost, (1) for large k, Mk has a Cournot equilibrium and (2) the
Cournot equilibria of Mk converge to the competitive equilibra of M. 
Using Theorem 3 this result can be considerably generalized: for 
downward sloping inverse demand, as long as the markets Mk converge to
M in an appropriate sense, (1) for large k, Mk has a Cournot
equilibrium and (2) the Cournot equilibria converge to the competitive 
equilibrium of H. (When firms are identical and have convex cost 
21 
functions, this result requires that the measure of available firms in 
M be finite. As discussed above, this need not rule out endogenous 
determination of the number of active firms in other cases. ) General 
results of this type are contained in Novshek [1983]. The existence 
question, (1), is also addressed in Bamon and Fraysse [1983]. In 
their paper, Bamon and Fraysse independently prove a fixed point 
theorem which is similar to, but weaker than, Theorem 3. Their result 
directly assumes that reaction correspondences have at most one jump, 
which is down, and have slope everywhere greater than negative one. 
These assumptions are natural consequences of the assumptions they 
place on cost functions in their sequence of markets framework, though 
they may not hold in a single market. 
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IMSSS Technical report 420. I am grateful to participants in the 
USC Modeling Research Group Economic Theory seminar and the UCLA 
Mathematical Economics Theory Workshop for their comments. All 
errors are my own. 
1. Kim Border brought to my attention a paper by Nishimura and 
Friedman (1981] in which they prove a third type of existence 
theorem for Cournot equilibrium. They have an assumption on the 
derived reaction correspondence which does not have a natural 
counterpart in terms of the primitive inverse demand and cost 
functions. Their assumption requires that for any Cy1,y2,
····Yn) 
which is not an equilibrium, for at least one firm j, either all 
optimal responses to Y by firm j are strictly greater than yj for 
all Y sufficiently near � y., or they are all strictly less than . l. 
l. J 
y . •  In this paper we are concerned with assumptions on the basic 
J 
elements of the model, inverse demand and cost functions, and 
t�eir relationship to the existence question. 
2. This implies marginal cost is nondecreasing where defined. 
Average cost could be U-shaped in the case treated, by McHanus, 
but the cost function could not be discontinuous at zero. Thus 
C(O) was a sunk cost, and the relevant cost function, 
C*(y) = C(y) - C(O), has a non-decreasing average cost. 
23 
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